NOTÍCIAS DA GUERRA POPULAR: [** MAOIST_REVOLUTION **] Nepal: A Revolution at a Political Crossroads (Debate)

Nepal: A Revolution at a Political Crossroads

The FIRE Collective published a pamphlet "A Revolution at the Brink: Stand With Nepal" � to build support for the revolution in Nepal. Ka Frank posted the following criticism of that pamphlet.

by Ka Frank

This new pamphlet is a welcome addition to the literature on the revolution in Nepal. However, it is an idealized version of the current situation in Nepal and within the UCPN (Maoist), which is reflected in the title of the pamphlet�"A Revolution at the Brink." It is more accurate to characterize the revolution in Nepal as being at a political crossroads.

What is missing is a recognition of the ongoing�and decisive�debate in the leadership and ranks of the UCPN (Maoist) about the road forward for the revolution.

At the National Convention of the party in November 2008, Chairman Prachanda's views came under public criticism from a number of senior party leaders, including Kiran (Mohan Baidya), Guarav (CP Gajurel) and Biplap (Netra Bikram Chand). The main issue of political strategy was whether the party should go for a People's Republic, completing the new democratic revolution through the seizure of state power, or Prachanda's revisionist position that the party should consolidate the present bourgeois republic and limit itself to a process of state restructuring. (See Bastola's "Historic National Convention: Milestone of Revolution," in the December 1-15, 2008 Red Star, and CP Gajurel's "The Role of Major Tactical Line in Developing a New Constitution" in the January 16-31, 2009 Red Star.)

The Conference united around a compromise that merged the two positions. This resolution delivered a partial blow that has restrained the revisionist strategy that had been dominant, and has given more freedom of action to the revolutionary forces in the party. Since the leadership of neither side was defeated, the line struggle has not ended but has moved out of public view in recent months.

The new formulation of waging struggle from the government, the parliament and the streets points to such a shift to the Left. (The revolutionary forces in the party have been stressing the struggle from the streets.) The efforts of the Maoist-led government to sack the army chief of staff, which has brought the Maoist mass base out into the streets in a way not seen since the April 2006 uprising against the monarchy, also points in this direction. Just the fact that Basanta could publicly state that "the Nepalese oppressed class has now arrived at a very glorious but more challenging juncture of seizing central power through a process of people's rebellion of the Nepalese specifically under the leadership of our party the Unified CPN (Maoist)" is another sign of this shift. (Red Star, March 16-31, 2009).

Without saying so explicitly, this pamphlet, and prior Kasama writings on Nepal, promote the view that a revolutionary line has been in command of the party and has been implemented since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2006, in the face of substantial evidence to the contrary.

In Nepal, the revolution, and the UCPN (Maoist) are at a political crossroads that will determine whether the bulk of the Maoist forces will get further submerged in administering a bourgeois/ feudal state and trying to push it to the left�which will represent a serious setback to the revolutionary process�or a new wave of Maoist-led revolutionary struggle will lead to the seizure of power and the victory of the new democratic revolution as a transition to socialism in Nepal.

For a more developed discussion of this issue, see "Revolution and State Power in Nepal" and "More on Revolution and State Power in Nepal" on the website of the MLM Revolutionary Study Group. http://www.mlmrsg.com

Does Nepal's Revolution Deserve Support or Ambivalence?

Ka Frank posted a criticism of the new FIRE Collective pamphlet "A Revolution at the Brink: Stand With Nepal." Here Nando replies to that criticism.

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From Nando:

We agree on many things here. But let me for a moment focus on some disagreements:

I like the FIRE Collective's headline "A Revolution at the Brink: Stand with Nepal."

I think it corresponds with the approach we should take to building internationalist support, and (more to the point here) it represents a correct and dialectical appraisal about what is going on. (And it is not surprising that a short terse headline brings out disputes about what to say and promote.)

They are at the brink of a seizure of power. That doesn't mean that they will go for it, or that they will win. But it does mean that (for the first time in decades) communist movement has brought the people within reach of countrywide power. It is a great accomplishment, and needs to be forcefully brought to everyone's attention.

You write by contrast:

"It is more accurate to characterize the revolution in Nepal as being at a crossroads."

I think this represents a misread of the situation. It takes a secondary aspect of the situation (the very real two-line struggle in the Nepali Maoist party) and treats it as the principal aspect. (I feel like you don't think they do anything but fidget nervously and indecisively at this crossroads, much to your disapproval.)

Let's put it another way: It is October 1917, and our pamphlet can read "Bolsheviks prepare a Communist Insurrection" or "Party Debates Power Grab Amid Deep Disagreements." Aren't they both accurate?

In fact, yes, the Nepali party is at a crossroads � which is inherent in every great revolutionary moment.

In fact, can't you write that same headline about "crossroads" at any moment in their struggle? It actually doesn't capture the SPECIFICITY of this moment or of their achievement. (This is not just ANY crossroad � it is the one at the brink of countrywide seizure of power� and of preparing all the difficult materials needed to launch and win such an attempt.)

Seeing Revisionist Default, Then Startled at Each New Move Toward the Revolution

Here is the essence of this:

You seem to feel that this Nepali Maoist party is deep in revisionism, with only occasional sputters of revolutionary impulse. Then when they again start talking in public about insurrection and new armed struggle you get excited and write:

"The new formulation of waging struggle from the government, the parliament and the streets points to such a shift to the Left."

It is as if you have a negative pessimistic view of their intentions most of the time, as if you think their main leadership core is on the wrong road but under pressure. And then (over and over) when they don't dissolve their army, or when they leave the government, or when they start talking about new upsurge of militant struggle�. whenever signs of revolutionary advance become visible you excitedly think this is "such a shift to the left." (i.e. it is a shift from the revisionist default that you seem to see.)

And you have an elaborate analysis that Prachanda had the revisionist plan (of not going for Peoples Democracy) but (under pressure) reached (yet another) compromise. And so on.

Speaking for myself, I have read the same articles, and don't pretend to know the full picture of what Prachanda thinks (in private). A party leader (as I know from experience in the RCP) is both a point-person for a line, and also a unifying figure. They often can't (and don't) say what they are actually fighting for at each point of the inner party struggle �while they unleash those forces who do fight sharply for a particular program. There are wings in this party, and I imagine that Prachanda is a unifying figure in many ways. But I don't assume that their compromises are all "foul compromises."

There is a climate among some communists that assumes that all compromises are inherently evidence of lack of clarity on principles. With that approach, we will never organize anything with anybody. Politics is not the simple application of simple self-evident principles (from which compromise can only mean a departure). Politics requires the creation of allignments and programs in a dynamic matrix of events.

Look at what this party has done:

They launched a peoples war, they waged it successfully, they agreed to enter a political offensive (from 2006 til now), they won over remarkable political support, they have deeply "compared and contrasted" the three opposing roads (monarchism, bourgeois democracy and peoples democracy) before the eyes of millions of awakening people, they have withdrawn from the government, and they are now preparing to launch a new test of mass strength through open struggles (perhaps in preparation for insurrection.)

Why do you keep portraying them as lost and aimless in the same old crossroads?

Don't you see all the progress through VARIOUS crossroads?

I think they might seize power and embark on their idiosyncratic version of socialism, and some would STILL be grumbling that they are still stuck at that crossroads, and haven't yet made things clear the metaphysical way some think they must be made clear.

Approaching a Real Seizure of Power: Timing, Forces, Conjuncture, Unity, Tactics & the Element of Surprise

To win a revolution, the Nepali communists need to seize overall power. I believe that, you believe that, and I assume they believe that.

But there are sharp materialist questions of assessment. As a negative example, the RCP's Bob Avakian implies that the Nepalis have suffered a loss of "strategic will." i.e. he sums up that the core problem here is that they have lost their nerve in the face of the dangers. Well, that's easy for him to say.

But in fact there are material problems: they face a very real army, that they can either defeat or not. They tried it, and pulled back in 2006 based on their assessments then. They also now face mobilizing the population, specifically for a great revolutionary effort and for all the sacrifice that follows � which diverse sections of the population will either embrace or not.

And there are issues of program: seize power for what? What is the state, government and military situation that defines the victory?

A thought: There are forces in the Nepali party who argue that the transitional period should last a while longer. Why do they do that? Is it simply that they don't appreciate or desire Peoples Democracy? Is it possible that their assessment is that a move from the current unstable bourgeois democracy (coexisting uneasily with a monarchist army) can't be replaced by peoples democracy (at this particular moment)? There may be some forces who think it is unlikely that a poor landlocked country like Nepal can aspire to a socialist road for the forseeable future. And it is also possible that other forces think the socialist road is possible, but the insurrection is not yet ripe. These are questions to consider when trying to evaluate "the crossroads" of this party.

In other words, revolutionary timing is not just a matter of will or desire.

To make an actual insurrection you need to count noses, you need (as Lenin said) to launch from a high tide of popular indignation and effort. You need your core social base prepared and eager to take on this new challenge (which they aren't always prepared or eager for!) And you need a programmatic plan that applies in this particular situation, the will of the revolutionary people, and also serves as a bridge onwards to socialism.

You can't just pick a day and go � without specific prerequisites in place. I suggest people study the experiences of the German attempts of 1923 etc. which were treated precisely as just matters of will. In Germany the Comintern ordered the KPD to pick a day and launch an uprising. Their advanced forces went into motion, but without mass support. And they were crushed. History is full of shattered movements that thought they could just run on will.

And (of course) the objective difficulties also do fuel backward, capitulationist lines (that tend to exaggerate the desirability and stability of bourgeois democracy.)

But in Nepal, it is not a matter of "better insurrection now than later, better tomorrow than next week." It may very well be that the Maoists objectively can't seize power right now� and need to buy time and gain forces ("hasten and await"). It's not like we can say "they postponed insurrection, that's a bad sign" or "They are rushing the insurrection, they must now have a better line." It may be that postponing an insurrection is correct, for very real material reasons � or they may be able to launch and win one soon. I don't know, and I don't know how you can know from afar. This is no game.

In Weimar Germany (1919-1933) the German Communist Party never GOT the prerequisites for an insurrection. They had millions of supporters, they had an intense economic and political crisis. But the elements never came together. Perhaps they could have done some things better, perhaps that might have created an opening. But the fact is that it is not a given that you CAN launch an insurrection when you want one. It is not even a given that you will have one next year. And being impatient, assuming that caution is evidence of betrayal, is really often infantile. Again: go read about 1923. It is sobering.

But again: The Nepali Maoists are farther along than anyone would have expected. They have an army (which the KPD DIDN'T have), they now have experience in local and national power, they have had two years to train their military and political cadre in the skills of government, they have won over new sections of the people� So maybe they will get a chance! The fact that this is possible makes our internationalist work urgent.

I think the plan of the Nepali party was all along was to gather necessary forces, carry out countrywide seizure of power and establish a peoples democracy as a basis for the socialist road. I think the 2006 negotiations were a substage toward that (not a confused flirtation with capitulation). Unlike some people I don't think they ever gave up the road of armed revolution, or intended to dissolve their army, or abandon New Democracy and Socialism. AND i think the evidence has (so far!) confirmed that view (and that is perhaps one of the areas of disagreement, and an area for further exploration).

There were forces inside their party urging caution and going slow (as there inevitably are). I think there have been rightist winds in their party (as there often are in serious parties). I think new people entering their party and some of their leading people flirted with extending the "transition" indefinitely (in a way that would have meant embracing bourgeois democracy instead of peoples democracy).

But in fact, the existence of bourgeois headquarters was inherent in leading a revolution at a countrywide level. And it was persistent through the preparation, the carrying out, the victory and the aftermath of that revolution. It's no like the Maoists were ever NOT at a crossroads, or that they had to resolve their two line struggle in some metaphysical way (purges? no compromises?) to make any possible advance. No, that assumption would be dogmatic orthodoxy (similar to Hoxha's some of views) not Maoism.

The revolution does need to advance� and it does need to do that amid great debates and ongoing internal struggles � that will reach temporary resolution over specific decisions and plans, but which will continue for the life of the party.

What Are We Trying to do From Here?

It is not like our main task (internationally) is constantly to announce and publicize about the existence of this two line struggle. Should our pamphlets and teach-ins sound like some news wire of micro-debates in Nepal � all presented in a fretful air of distrust and disappointment?

Yes two line-struggle exists. Yes its outcome will determine whether this revolution passes OVER THE BRINK to an actual seizure of countrywide power. Yes our audiences need to know about the substantive issues a revolution faces, and the ways THIS revolution has chosen to debate and resolve them.

Put another way: The phrase "Revolution at the Brink" views the main contradiction as being between the revolution and the old society. The slogan "Revolution at the crossroads" presents the main contradiction as being between revolution and capitulation within the party. Both of those contradictions are very real. They are intensely intertwined.

But our approach to these matters is shaped by our task here: which is building support for a LIVING revolution. What people need to know (especially in a popular pamphlet) is that this revolutionary force has been built, that it has creatively made its way to this point, that it has a vision for the future, that it deserves our active political support, that people need to break the media whiteout, that the Maobadi are not "terrorists" etc. We should not hide the fact that revolutions have internal debates, of course. We should mention it, and we should (when appropriate and possible) help our audiences know what the lines are.

But the task of internationalists is not to produce a day-by-day press service about the health of revisionism in the Nepali communist movement, and that frets daily over whether we think "the good guys" are gaining ground in their debates.

The task of internationalists is to build real support and excitement over this revolution AND train new forces in a scientific view of what a revolution is (including an understanding of the inevitability and decisiveness of line struggle). We should bring out the controversies (and we have on Kasama from the beginning). The key thing here is to actively build support for this revolution's very real accomplishments and real potential. We should not be naive "cheer-leaders" training others in self-deception and mythic triumphalism. But we should build some much-deserved support and display some much deserved enthusiasm.

Ka Frank said
October 19, 2009 at 3:21 pm
I welcome Nando's very substantive reply to my criticism of the FIRE Collective's pamphlet on Nepal. It focuses on an important difference between us, which might at first appear to be simply different emphases, on the importance of the two-line struggle in the Unified CPN (Maoist).
Nando writes: "The phrase "Revolution at the Brink" views the main contradiction as being between the revolution and the old society. The slogan "Revolution at the crossroads" presents the main contradiction as being between revolution and capitulation within the party. Both of those contradictions are very real. They are intensely intertwined."
Yes, there are two different, intertwined contradictions at work. But it is essential to grasp the actual relationship between them. One of them is principal at this particular political moment. It is essential to grasp that the two-line struggle between revolutionary and revisionist lines in the party is principal at this time, and why this is so. The correct resolution of this contradiction will enable the people's revolution to defeat reaction in Nepal; the continuing dominance of the revisionist line will make it impossible for the revolution to advance.
Since 2006, Prachanda's revisionist line�which he put forward in straightforward terms at the November 2008 UCP(N) (Maoist) National Convention�has been the dominant line in the UCPN (Maoist). It sees the "transitional stage" of restructuring a bourgeois republic with Maoist leadership as a new stage of struggle that puts the new democratic revolution off into an undefined future.
The efforts of revolutionary forces in the party to defeat this line are DECISIVE as to whether the mass struggle will be able to pass over to a revolutionary struggle for power when the objective conditions ripen. I agree with Nando that the party is not in a position to undertake a struggle for power at present. The real question is whether the party will conduct its mass work with this as its principal political goal, or will continue be bogged down in efforts to cobble together a new Maoist-led government within the framework of a bourgeois/feudal republic.
There is another area where we appear to disagree. Nando writes the following about what the CPN (Maoist), and now the UCPN (Maoist), has done since 1996:
"They launched a peoples war, they waged it successfully, they agreed to enter a political offensive (from 2006 til now), they won over remarkable political support, they have deeply "compared and contrasted" the three opposing roads (monarchism, bourgeois democracy and peoples democracy) before the eyes of millions of awakening people, they have withdrawn from the government, and they are now preparing to launch a new test of mass strength through open struggles (perhaps in preparation for insurrection.)"
This is a idealized, one-sided assessment of the situation. In return for legality and political access to the urban areas, the party dismantled its organs of popular power in the countryside, allowing the reactionary parties back in to these previously liberated areas. The party ended the armed struggle and moved the PLA into camps under UN monitors, where the PLA has been largely isolated from their mass base for 3 years.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the CPN (Maoist) in 2006 calls for integrating the PLA into the much larger, reactionary Nepalese Army, which would retain its present command structure. Though there has undoubtedly been sharp struggle within the party and the PLA over whether to carry through with this process, attempting to do so would be the disintegration of the PLA as an effective political force. The view of some that this would allow the PLA to disintegrate the NA from within is dangerously wishful thinking. Again, the resolution of the two-line struggle in the party (in this case between revolution and capitulation) is critical as to whether the PLA will remain as an independent political and military force.
It is correct to stand with and support the people's revolution in Nepal.
At the same time, I believe it is necessary to criticize the revisionist line in the party, which is the principal obstacle at this point to the advance of the revolution. Since this line�which in actuality opposes the line of protracted people's war�is being aggressively promoted in some circles of the international communist movement, we have an internationalist obligation to oppose it.
(This is my understanding of the approach being taken by the CPI (Maoist) in its Open Letter to the UCPN (Maoist) in July 2009.)
Obviously it is not productive to make an obligatory reference to the specifics of the two-line struggle in the party�and to support the revolutionary line in opposition to the revisionist line� in every news item about developments in Nepal. However, it is critical to do so in major pieces about the revolution such as this new FIRE pamphlet.
Finally, it is incumbent on us as internationalists to expose and oppose Indian and U.S. imperialist intervention in Nepal.

Alastair Reith said
October 19, 2009 at 7:26 pm
//This is a idealised, one-sided assessment of the situation. In return for legality and political access to the urban areas, the party dismantled its organs of popular power in the countryside, allowing the reactionary parties back in to these previously liberated areas.//
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/1191-maoists-form-parallel-govt-.html
http://www.telegraphnepal.com/news_det.php?news_id=6223
The Vietnamese did this plenty of times. The CCP did it too, and actually held back peasant struggles against the landlords in order to help the war effort. revolutionary strategies do not proceeed in a straight line. Seriously man, these points have been adressed and proven wrong soooo many times.
//The party ended the armed struggle and moved the PLA into camps under UN monitors, where the PLA has been largely isolated from their mass base for 3 years.//
They can be battle ready in a matter of minutes, and I don't believe they've been isolated from their mass base. There are plenty of reports, including ones here on Kasama, that the cantonments have been turned into revlutionary schools for the PLA fighters, raising their theoretical and practical understanding of communism. And also, the Maoists in many cases picked areas where they had not much of a mass base to put their cantonments, and have used the cantonments to spread their influence. Some cantonments provide free healthcare to people nearby, and so on. The Maoists are an undefeated party and the PLA are an undefeated army, and they're continuing to move forward. The basic fact of the matter is that the Maoists are in a much stronger position now than they were in 2006. They've strengthened their mass base, shown the masses IN PRACTICE that it the old state structure and the old reactionary forces will not allow peaceful change, they've spread their influence into the cities (the organisation they now have with the trade unions and the student unions is a good example of how succesful this has been) and they're generally in a very, very strong position.
"The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the CPN (Maoist) in 2006 calls for integrating the PLA into the much larger, reactionary Nepalese Army, which would retain its present command structure. Though there has undoubtedly been sharp struggle within the party and the PLA over whether to carry through with this process, attempting to do so would be the effective disintegration of the PLA as a coherent political force. The view that this would allow the PLA to disintegrate the NA from within is dangerously wishful thinking. Again, the resolution of the two-line struggle in the party (in this between revolution and capitulation) is critical as to whether the PLA will remain as an independent political and military force."
Think about this for a second. How can the military function if its ranks have suddenly been filled with passionate, dedicate communist revolutionaries? If this was just a case of the PLA dissolving into the NA in an act of surrender, why would the leaders of the Nepal Congress, much of the UML and of course the army be so bitterly opposed to it happening? Why does it scare them so much? The army chiefs are constantly coming out with statements opposing "indoctrinated" Maoist fighters into their ranks. Integration scares them! It's a risk, it's a gamble, all that's true. But the Maoists haven't gotten to where they are now by following the methods of the past, they've advanced through creativity and trying new things. Integration should at the very least make it very difficult for a coup to take place and for the army to operate, and it could result in the revolutinary soldiers winning over sections of the former Nepal Army.
That said, I don't think army integration is likely to happen. There's none of the `consensus' so beloved of Nepali political leaders around it, everyone can see it for what it is � an attempt by the Maoists to take over the state, and all the army and political leaders are bitterly opposed to it. We'll see what happens, but I don't think it's going to happen.

Ka Frank said
October 19, 2009 at 11:56 pm
Alistair Reith claims that the Communist Party of China gave up its base areas during its struggle for liberation. This is misleading and factually wrong. At one point (I think it was 1941), in exchange for GMD concessions, the CCP withdrew some of its forces from southern China, which were in an exposed position. In the face of pressure from the Soviet Union and Comintern representatives in the party, Mao and the CCP refused to disband its main bases in the north and the PLA was never demobilized and integrated with GMD armies. Mao maneuvered politically at time, including in the form of proposals to form a coalition with the GMD and other parties, but he refused to give up its independent political and military role. This enabled the CCP to isolate the GMD among middle forces and prepare for a final showdown with the reactionaries.
In contrast, the CPN (Maoist) ended the armed struggle in 2006, placed the PLA in a extremely disadvantageous position, and gave up the liberated areas. This is a fait accompli, and the revolutionary forces in the UCPN (Maoist) are now faced with a more difficult situation than they faced in 2006.
On the situation with the PLA: There is no doubt that the PLA has had continuing contacts with the masses in the areas close to their cantonments. But what they have lost is their organic connection with millions of peasants in the once liberated areas, which can only be maintained and deepened by continuing people's war.
Reith claims that the "PLA can be battle ready in a matter of minutes." While they can get their guns out of storage quickly, the PLA will not be battle ready in any meaningful sense of the term. It will take them time to return to their original positions and to renew their ties with the masses. In the meantime the PLA will be dangerously vulnerable to attack by the much larger and better armed Nepalese Army (it has helicopter gunships). Thus, the UCPN (Maoist) is in a much weaker position militarily now, and is further from the conquest of power than it was three years ago.
Reith's argument is that integrating the PLA with the Nepalese Army must be good if it is opposed by the army high command. Actually, the NA generals support the vetting and integration of the PLA as individuals; they have drawn the line at unit integration as potentially destabilizing. These are their calculations.
However, from the standpoint of advancing the people's revolutionary struggle, even integration of PLA units into the much larger NA would be a major setback. There are 90,000 plus in the NA vs. 19,000 in the PLA, and that number is declining as underage PLA members are removed from the cantonments. In addition, PLA units integrated into the NA would be under the command of reactionary officers. The efforts of former PLA soldiers to work among the rank and file of the NA would face many obstacles under these conditions.
In exchange for the illusory promise of "disintegrating" the Nepalese Army from within, the PLA itself would be dismantled as a revolutionary political-military force. Nevertheless, Prachanda and others in the leadership of the UCPN (Maoist) continue to advocate integrating the PLA into the NA. This is part and parcel of a profound revisionist misunderstanding of the reactionary role and essence of the bourgeois state�concentrated in its armed forces� that must be rejected if the revolution in Nepal is to advance to victory. The Nepalese Army must be destroyed by the people, not reformed by the addition of several thousand former PLA members.
In an October 2009 interview posted on http://www.southasianrev.com, Prachanda put out his position that when the PLA is integrated into the Nepalese Army, the new army will be "completely the army of the people."
Q: If the integration of the army takes place and if a unified National Army is constituted as the result of the merger of the Nepali army and the PLA, in that case are you conscious of the impending dangers? What I want to say cannot that army be used against you once you are out of power? The reason for this is what is the guarantee that the army constituting of the revolutionary cadres of the PLA and regular armymen nursing feudal would stand in the favour of people?
A; That danger is there, but we have faith in people. I have faith in integration of the army. If the integration of the army takes place then it should be viewed as the victory of the situation created through the peoples struggle. Obviously the entire army will stand in favour of the people. The army will stand in favour of the nation. And under the leadership of the party we could lead the country in a better way. This is my belief.
Just some time back you wanted to know why the Indian ambassador, Mr Rakesh Sood and Mr Girija Prasad Koirala of Nepali Congress has been opposed to integration of army. Do you think they would have opposed this if the reactionary forces have visualized that the integrated army would stand in favour of reactionary forces?
Once the integration takes place this army would ceased to be theirs. This would be completely the army of the people. Which is why they are speaking against it and trying to create hurdles. One should realize that the integration of army is not against Maoists. This is not against the people. This is in favour of people. This is the reason that the reactionary forces outside the country and also inside quite active against it. One should understand this.

Alastair Reith said
October 20, 2009 at 5:48 am
The key point Ka Frank is that Mao and the CCP were flexible in their tactics, and changed them according to the needs of the situation at the time. During the Northern Expedition the GMD and the CCP were integrated to a much greater degree than the Nepali comrades are advocating. During the war against the Japanese the red army operate under the command of the GMD, although you're right that at that time full blown integration didn't take place.
I also think it's false to imagine that the Maoists have given up their base areas. All reports indicate that they maintain political hegemony over these areas and retain mass support, and I note you didn't engage with the links I provided to news reports about the Maoists officially reconvening their parallel government and announcing that they will be forming local government bodies themselves.
http://comradealastair.wordpress.com/2009/09/05/confirmed-maoist-parallel-government-has-been-revived/
Why do you assume that because Maoist leaders SAY they will dissolve the base areas and the parallel state they will? Do you expect them to lay out their plans for revolution in minute detail for all to see? While transparency and popular involvement are great, it doesn't really work like that.
You are overemphasising the military aspect of the struggle and downplaying the political. Yes, the PLA would not be able to return to the exact positions it held in the early 2000s overnight. But the fact of the matter is the PLA did not have the strength to take Kathmandu in 2006. Their attacks on fortified military bases were failures. They did not have the favourable situation of a world war like Lenin and Mao both did, and could rely only on what was possible in Nepal at that time. Revolution is not about a military conquest of power by the PLA � it's about a seizure of power by the toiling masses, driven forward and made possible by the armed struggle of the PLA and the political leadership of the UCPN (M). And since 2006, the UCPN (M) had not grown any weaker and I would argue has grown quite a bit stronger in this regard. They were not able to operate effectively in the urban areas during the PW. Now they can, and they've made very good use of it. The leadership of the UCPN (M) are not gods, they're men and they are both fallible and complex. There are differences of opinion on a whole range of issues, and two line struggles do take place. But I think it's false to claim from afar that Prachanda and co are revisionists when there's really not a lot to support that claim.
Finally, one very major way the changes in the nature of the struggle since 2006 have strengthened the Maoists is how it has strengthened internal democracy. The Maoists have a very, almost surprisingly democratic internal culture. It is possible for Maoist leaders to publish articles that accuse Prachanda, the party leader, of supporting a revisionist path. Their party has carried out a number of debates and struggles in a thoroughly democratic and comradely way that did not result in a split (which is good practice and a nice departure from the past) and instead took party unity forward. The grassroots cadre of the party are able to control it and keep it on a revolutionary path, and it's easier to have this kind of internal debate in such a free and open manner now than it was before the CPA. During a time of war, military discipline is needed, and the leadership tends to keep very tight control over things. Now it's possible to have a more open internal culture. Compare for example the demotion of Bhattarai, Hisila Yami and some others before the peace accords to the way Kiran and others are able to challenge aspects of Prachanda's political line now.
This is not to say the Maoists were undemocratic before the CPA � far from it. But the fact that military discipline and near absolute secrecy is no longer required means that it is possible to allow more space for internal debate and it's easier to carry it out in a way that involves the party grassroots.
//Reith's argument is that integrating the PLA with the Nepalese Army must be good if it is opposed by the army high command. Actually, the NA generals support the vetting and integration of the PLA as individuals; they have drawn the line at unit integration as potentially destabilizing. These are their calculations.//
My argument is a bit less simple than that. My point was that the generals would not be so bitterly opposed to integration AS THE MAOISTS WANT IT if they saw it as a surrender, and I don't believe the NA generals are stupid enough to not be able to tell if the PLA is surrendering. The Maoists have refused so far to allow integration on an individual basis, and are refusing to even allow the "child" soldiers to be discharged unless economic packages are provided for them, which the government has refused. Everything to do with the PLA and all discussions around it end up in a stalemate � the very existence of the PLA has created a crisis in Nepal that will not go away. The state can't accept two armies continuing to exist, it can't destroy the PLA but knows the PLA can't militarily destroy it. The Maoists so far have been very clever in how they've used this to their advantage.
Some communists have a gut tendency to condemn overseas revolutions for not following the exact path they think they should. Others see it as their duty to extend internationalist support to the revolutionary forces without pretending that we know enough about the facts on the ground to make assumptions about the situation we really shouldn't be making. I think the latter kind of communist has the correct approach and it's the one I try to follow.

N3Wday said
October 20, 2009 at 8:19 am
Ka Frank says,
"In return for legality and political access to the urban areas, the party dismantled its organs of popular power in the countryside, allowing the reactionary parties back in to these previously liberated areas."
Point 1: I think there is a gross underestimation of how important this political access has been. Later Ka Frank mentions things like gun helicopters and the PLAs position in the camps. Well, lets look at this. What happened during the uprising of 2006 when the army was ordered to fire upon the maoists in the midst of a huge demonstration? The rank and file of the RNA refused and the uprising toppled the monarchy. Now, lets think about the significance of the UCPN now having hundreds of thousands of explicit supporters and cadre all throughout the cities. What would happen if the NA took their gun helicopters to the camps? How many do they have (one, two, three)? I can't think of a single thing that would better pave the way for insurrection. How much of the PLA is in the camps anyway, how many of the YCL used to be fighters and are now in the cities prepared for such an event?
Point 2: The parallel governments are not fully dismantled. Allastair pointed to this. They don't always operate explicitly but they are still there and have been revived at a moments notice more than a couple of times. Why�since they have been accused of this multiple times before and every time there has been a political crisis the parallel government reemerged�is there still lack of clarity here?
Point 3: The UCPN has always allowed the reactionary parties into their base areas. During the revolution they had elections and allowed the UML and NC to run. They did this to test their strength and influence among the people in order to find out what areas they needed to step up their political work.
***
I'm not going to say everything is perfect. I often wonder about what the fate of Nepal will be if things never reach a critical mass, and stagnate at the point they are now without being able to move forward. But, I do think that a lot of the things people criticize them for are moot points.
The integration situation is complex. I don't have time to comment on it now, but I will attempt to later.

Ka Frank said
October 20, 2009 at 11:45 pm
In comment 6, Alistair Reith points out, correctly, that the CPN (Maoist) did not have the strength to take Kathmandu in 2006. This was true of a number of other cities and major army bases as well.
However, this does not mean that the party's only viable alternative was to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and end the armed struggle. It could have intensified its underground work in the urban centers and among the rank and file RNA soldiers, and deepened its political support in the 80% of the country the PLA had liberated. This was particularly needed in the Terai, where narrowly focused Madhesi political parties also had a mass following.
This strategy of persisting in the protracted peoples war, while awaiting more favorable conditions for a final push to take the cities, was not guaranteed to be successful. It also had to make political and military preparations to deal with the threat of Indian intervention. The Chinese revolution had to go through several stages and ups and downs between the 1920s and 1949.
At the same time, maintaining the people's war would have strengthened the revolutionary forces in the UCPN (Maoist). Signing the CPA, ending the armed struggle and reorienting the party towards peaceful work in a "transitional period" gave the upper hand to a revisionist line in the UCPN (Maoist), which stands in the way of the development of a new strategy leading towards the seizure of state power and the advent of the new democratic revolution.

Ka Frank said

October 22, 2009 at 10:09 pm

In his recent comment (Oct. 22) on Bhatterai's alleged remarks about the relevance of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution (that is, the dismissal of the possibility of socialism in one country), Nando describes the actual terms of the debate inside the UCPN (Maoist) today on this question and how it is closely entwined with the two-line debate over political strategy.

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"Nepal is one of the world's poorest countries. It is landlocked. It has virtually no industry. And it is surrounded by two of the world's largest countries (India and China). It is vulnerable to blockades. Its main natural resource (hydroelectric power) requires massive capital investment to exploit or export in any major way. And its lowland agricultural regions are very vulnerable to military occupation from India.

In that context, there is a debate within the Maoist party of Nepal over whether they can take a road of socialism in the current international climate (where there are no socialist countries and not yet a clear prospect of revolutionary victory within India over the short term).

They are debating whether to soon seize power, establish a peoples democracy, and take the socialist road. Or to postpone it, operate within a bourgeois democratic framework of post-monarchical Nepal, and solicit international investment in hyroelectric projects � and then, when a more favorable context develops internationally, to seize power and take the socialist road.

One argument says it would be reckless and premature to go it alone in this context. Another says that waiting may mean the chance of revolution will slip away. The painstakingly gathered revolutionary forces could be demoralized, dissipated, or even crushed by such a delay.

The debate (in short) is over whether to draw out the current "transition" period � or to cut it short by now preparing a seizure of power.

In that context, Bhattarai is associated with the line of extending the transition period. He was also a major author of the whole substage of "transition period" and the proposal for the 2006 negotiated ceasefire and political offensive."

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While the potential for economic isolation and Indian intervention are real, I believe that the danger of the dissipation of the revolutionary forces is more serious and potentially fatal to the revolution in Nepal.

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